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Smoothing the Rugged Parts of the
Passage: Scots Law and its
Edinburgh Chair1
Kenneth G C Reid☼
A. THE CHAIR
(1) Foundation
(2) The first professor
(3) Bayne and his successors
(4) And their inaugural lectures
B. THE LITERATURE
(1) The four discouragements
(2) No publishers
(3) No foreign travel
(4) No readers
(5) No impact
C. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
☼ Professor of Scots Law, University of Edinburgh. This is a revised version of an inaugural
lecture given on 18 September 2012. The lecture itself is captured at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YTFW7XXqBxY. I am grateful to George Gretton, Elspeth Reid, and an anonymous reviewer
for insightful comments.
1 Baron David Hume, Lectures 1786-1822 vol I (ed G C H Paton; Stair Society vol 5, 1939) 2: “The
purpose then of establishing this Chair was to put young men in the best road to that knowledge [of
Scots law], and to smooth for them the more rugged parts of the passage”.
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A. THE CHAIR
(1) Foundation
Founded by the Town Council on 28 November 1722,2 the Chair of Scots Law
was the third of the law chairs at Edinburgh University,3 lagging only slightly
behind the Regius Chair of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations
(1707) and the Chair of Civil Law (1710).4 The name “Scots Law” was in contrast
to the “Civil Law” of the chair of that name: the holder of the latter instructed
students in the Civil or Roman law, the holder of the former in Scots or municipal
law.5 The Chair of Scots Law was the first devoted solely to municipal law in
Scotland – indeed the first in the United Kingdom, for the creation of the Vinerian
Chair of English Law at Oxford still lay more than 30 years in the future.6 Before
1722 knowledge of Scots law, if it was acquired at all, had had to be acquired by
independent study or – except in Glasgow where a course had been offered at the
University since 17147 – by attending private lectures.8
Further provision for the Chair was made in an Act of the new Parliament of
the United Kingdom, the Edinburgh Beer Duties Act of 1722.9 Crucially, the Act
2 For an account of the early chairs, see Sir Alexander Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh
during Its First Hundred Years (1884) vol I, 282-90.
3 Or fourth if one counts the Chair of Universal History (1719) which in due course metamorphosed into
the Chair of Constitutional Law.
4 On the establishing of the Regius Chair, see J W Cairns, “The origins of the Edinburgh Law School: the
Union of 1707 and the Regius Chair” (2007) 11 EdinLR 300.
5 Indeed, in the early years, the Chair was quite often referred to, including by its holders, as the Chair of
Municipal Law.
6 On the proliferation of chairs of national law in the eighteenth century, see M D Gordon, “The Vinerian
Chair: an Atlantic perspective”, in P Birks (ed), The Life of the Law: Proceedings of the Tenth British
Legal History Conference Oxford 1991 (1993) 195.
7 This was given byWilliam Forbes, the Regius Professor of Civil Law. Indeed by the time the first lectures
on Scots law were being given in Edinburgh, Forbes had published a textbook for the use of his students:
see William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland vol I (1722, reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal
Education Trust 2012), and see in particular Forbes’ explanation, at 9-10 of the 2012 reprint. See also
J W Cairns, “The origins of the Glasgow Law School: the Professors of Civil Law, 1714-61”, in Birks (ed),
The Life of the Law (n 6) 151 at 174 ff.
8 Alexander Bayne, the first person to be appointed to the Chair of Scots Law, had indeed previously given
a course of such private lectures. For the difficulties of earlier study, particularly before the publication
of Craig’s Jus Feudale in 1655, see A Bayne, A Discourse on the Rise and Progress of the Law of Scotland
and the Method of Studying it, For the Use of Students of the Municipal Law, included as a supplement
to Bayne’s edition of Sir Thomas Hope’s Minor Practicks (1726) 150-87 at 183-5; Hume, Lectures vol I
(n 1) 1-4.
9 9 Geo I c 14. In the same breath as the Chair of Scots Law, the Act confirmed the Chair of Universal
History: “which Two Professions of Universal Civil History, Greek and Roman Antiquities, and of Scots
Law, theMagistrates and Council of the said City, are and shall be authorized and impowered to institute
and establish, and to nominate and appoint the first Professors, who shall enjoy the said Salaries, and be
instituted to the whole Privileges and Immunities, that the other Professors of the said University enjoy,
and are intitled to”.
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made provision for payment of a salary, of £100 a year,10 from the proceeds of a
continued tax of two pennies Scots (1/6 of a penny Sterling) per pint “upon all
Ale brewed, brought in, tapped, or sold” in Edinburgh,11 a subvention doubtless
greeted with enthusiasm by the drinking classes of the city. In truth this was
only one of a large number of statutory charges on the fund, which included
the no less pressing matter of providing a water supply, narrowing “the noxious
lake on the north side of the said city, commonly called the North Lock, into a
canal of running water”, and building “a proper hall, or other conveniences, for
accommodating the Court of Justiciary”.
(2) The first professor
The first person to be appointed to the Chair of Scots Law was Alexander Bayne
of Rires.12 Typically for his time, he had studied Scots law with John Spotswood
in Edinburgh13 and Civil law at the University of Leiden before being admitted
as an advocate in 1714. At the time of his appointment he was around 40 years
of age although his precise date of birth is uncertain.14 The circumstances of his
appointment were described by Lord Kames to James Boswell as follows:15
Lord Kames told me this evening that a Mr Bayne of Logie, known by the name
of Logie Bayne, was the first regular Professor of Scots Law here. He was first an
advocate at this bar, but did not succeed. He then went to London and resided some
years, thinking to try the English bar. But that would not do either. He returned to
Scotland in low circumstances and knew very little law. But such was the effect of a
grave countenance and a slow, formal manner, a neatness of expression and the English
accent, that the advocates sent a deputation to ask him to accept of being professor,
which he did most readily.
10 £100 remained the salary throughout the eighteenth century and, no doubt, beyond. A list of Edinburgh
University salaries is given in The Scots Magazine for February 1796 (at 115). The Professor of Scots
Law was paid the same as the other law professors except for the Regius Professor, who received £200.
In other Faculties, including Medicine, the salaries were generally lower. Overall the salaries were said
to be “by far too small”, but it should be recalled that they were supplemented by class fees paid by
students so that George Joseph Bell, for example, is thought to have earned about £750 from the Chair:
see K G C Reid, “From text-book to book of authority: the Principles of George Joseph Bell” (2011) 15
EdinLR 6 at 8.
11 The money was not, however, to be available until 1 July 1723, and it may be that the first lectures were
not given until then.
12 See R L Emerson, Academic Patronage in the Scottish Enlightenment (2008) 264-5.
13 On Spotswood see J W Cairns, “John Spotswood, Professor of Law: a preliminary sketch”, in W M
Gordon (ed), Miscellany Three (Stair Society vol 39, 1992) 131. In later life there may have been a
sense of rivalry between teacher and pupil: see W Menzies, “Alexander Bayne of Rires, Advocate”
(1924) 36 JR 60 at 63-4.
14 For further biographical information, see J W Cairns, “Bayne, Alexander, of Rires (c 1684-1737)”
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). See also Menzies (n 13).
15 C McL Weis and F A Pottle (eds), Boswell in Extremes, 1776-1778 (1971) 213.
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But this unflattering account was given more than 50 years after the events it
purported to describe16 and, in any event, as Lord Braxfield was to comment to
Boswell in the context of Bayne, “Kames thinks nothing of any law book but [his
own] Principles of Equity”. For his own part Braxfield “thought well” of Bayne.17
In addition to being a lawyer of at least moderate accomplishment, Bayne was
also a composer of some note18 and a painter.
Bayne’s manner of lecturing is well documented, not least by Bayne himself.
“When I entred upon the Profession of the Municipal Law”, Bayne was later to
write, “I thought it became me rather to take Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions
for my Text-Book, than to give one of my own, for this obvious Reason, that it was
a Book of Authority, universally esteemed, and infinitely superior to any I could
give”.19 But as Mackenzie’s text was too terse to be understood by those new to
the law, Bayne’s “first business”, as he explained to his students in his inaugural
lecture:20
will be shortly to give you our Author’s Meaning in other Words . . . This being done,
I retouch the same Matters in a more formal Discourse, and I add to them such other
Matters as are coincident with the Subject of the Paragraph I’m upon, which are to be
gathered partly from my Lord Stair’s Institutions, partly from the later Decisions, and
some of the other Authors upon our Law.
Bayne’s method of proceeding was thus to go through Mackenzie’s work,
paragraph by paragraph, to summarise and explain the text, and then to add new
material of his own at a sufficiently slow pace that it could be taken down “as
accurately as you can” by his audience. If the sets of notes which have survived
are any guide, then his students were unusually careful in their transcription,
for in a random comparison the passages selected were invariably identical.21
16 Kames had not been a pupil of Bayne. On the other hand, as he passed advocate on 22 January 1723
he would have been aware of the legal gossip of the time.
17 J W Reed and F A Pottle (eds), Boswell: Laird of Auchinleck, 1778-1782 (1993) 239-40. I am grateful
to Dan Carr for this reference.
18 Some of his cantatas for solo voice were performed at a concert held in St Cecilia’s Hall in Edinburgh on
24 November 2007 to mark the tercentenary of the Edinburgh Law School. On this aspect of Bayne’s
life, too, Kames was unflattering: “He was a sort of musical composer but of no taste in music, for he
was quite inattentive to the finest pieces at the concert till his own performances were played, and then
he fell to the harpsichord and was all alive”: Weis & Pottle (eds), Boswell in Extremes (n 15) 213.
19 Alexander Bayne, Notes for the Use of the Students of the Municipal Law In the University of
Edinburgh: Being a Supplement to Sir George MacKenzie’s Institutions (1731, with a later printing
in 1749) iii.
20 Bayne Discourse (n 8) 169.
21 It is possible, however, that they copied from a common source. Three sets of student notes are held
in Edinburgh University Library (shelf marks Gen.57D, Gen.794D, and E8411 ms 2668). The titles
chosen for two of these are of interest (the third is untitled), bringing out that Bayne was doing more
than commenting on the work of another writer : “The dictates of Mr Alexr Bain Professor of the Scots
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Nonetheless, Bayne was so dissatisfied “by the increasing Number of written
Copies, and these being become very incorrect” that in 1731 he caused his notes
to be published.22 His lectures on criminal law, a topic barely touched on by
Mackenzie, had been published the previous year.23
The published notes give a reasonably clear idea of what it must have been like
to attend Bayne’s class. The lectures, which took place at the invigorating hour of
7 am, were given in the vernacular and not, like those of many other professors,
in Latin, and the emphasis was firmly on the transmission of information.24 A
surprisingly large number of Mackenzie’s paragraphs are left unadorned, but
when Bayne does comment, his remarks are often extensive, bringing the law
up to date and adding in material omitted by Mackenzie. His style, however, is
hardly less terse than that of the text on which he is commenting. One example
must suffice to give the flavour of the whole. Under the heading of “Subject-
Matter of Obligations”, Mackenzie says this:25
To make Obligations effectual, it is necessary, that the Subject-Matter thereof be such
as will admit of an Obligation: For no Man can oblige himself to do what is either
impossible, unlawful, or dishonest, nor to transmit the Property of Things sacred,
(these not being in Commercio;) and albeit, when the Performance of Obligations
becomes imprestable, the Party is liable for the Value, as Damage and Interest; yet in
these the Value is not due, nor will he be liable in a Penalty, in Case of not Performance.
But yet a Man may oblige himself to do Something not in his own Power, as to cause
another dispone Lands; and if he fail, he will be liable pro damno & interesse, or for
the Penalty.
Law at Edinbourgh being a Commentary Upon Sir George Mckenzies Institutes of the law of Scotland
1st Novr 1728”, and, more succinctly, “Bayne’s Notes on Mackenzie”.
22 Bayne, Notes (n 19) iv.
23 Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland. For the Use of the Students who attend the Lectures
of Alexander Bayne, JP (1730). This was the same year in which the Regius Professor at Glasgow,
William Forbes, published the volume of his Institutes of the Law of Scotland concerning criminal
law (reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust in 2012). Forbes’s work was much the more
substantial – 373 pages compared to the 191 pages of Bayne’s – and was based on a manuscript which
was much more substantial still, the Great Body of the Law of Scotland (unpublished but available
electronically at http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/). For Bayne’s lectures on criminal law, see J W
Cairns, “Teaching criminal law in early eighteenth-century Scotland: collegia and compendia” (2014)
20 Fundamina 90, 96-8.
24 The venue was first of all the Hall of the Incorporation of Mary’s Chapel in Niddry’s Wynd and, from
1735 onwards, the University buildings. As with the private teachers of law whom Bayne replaced, the
classes were essentially private “colleges” (collegia), based on a model popular in and familiar from the
Netherlands. See Cairns (n 23) 92, 95-6.
25 Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (1688) 3.3.28
and 29.
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Bayne responds with a wide-ranging but unadorned list:26
The chief Vices in Contracts are, 1mo. The Want of reasonable Knowledge of the
Matters transacted, occasioned by some substantial Error, or through some natural
Infirmity of the Parties contracting. 2do. The Want of Freedom and Liberty through
violent Force and just Fear. 3tio. The Want of Sincerity and Integrity, and the inducing
a Consent through Fraud and Surprise, which otherways would not have been given.
4to. The Want of Capacity to adhibit a just Consent, which is a Vice that admits of no
Temperament, because, where there is no Consent, there can be no Contract. 5to. An
unlawful Subject-Matter.27
Probably the dictated commentaries, which Bayne eventually printed, were
accompanied by a degree of less formal exposition and explanation, although
there appears to be no trace of this in the student notes that have survived.28 But
even so, there was little in Bayne’s methods to aid understanding, and nothing
to encourage speculative thought or a burning interest in the subject under
discussion. Perhaps the best that can be said of his teaching is that it succeeded
in attracting students;29 and from this rather modest beginning was to grow a
distinguished pedagogical tradition surrounding the Edinburgh Chair.
(3) Bayne and his successors
Alexander Bayne remained as Professor of Scots Law until his death in 1737,
some fifteen years after his appointment. Since then there have been a further
sixteen Professors, in almost uninterrupted succession.30 The following is a
complete list:
The seventeen Professors
1 1722-1737 Alexander Bayne
2 1737-1765 John Erskine
3 1765-1786 William Wallace
4 1786-1822 David Hume
5 1822-1843 George Joseph Bell
26 Bayne, Notes (n 19) 107.
27 Bayne then completes his commentary by setting out the legal effects: “The Vices of Contracts give
either Cause to annul them, or to repair the Damages they have occasioned, or both”.
28 The existence of such informal material is suggested in various passages from the Discourse (n 8), in
particular 177 and 180-1.
29 Unlike William Forbes, the Professor in Glasgow: see Cairns (n 23) 98.
30 There was a gap of two years between the retirement of Robert Black in 2006 and my own appointment
in 2008.
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6 1843-1861 John Shank More
7 1861-1863 George Ross
8 1863-1865 George Moir
9 1865-1888 Norman Macpherson
10 1888-1922 Sir John Rankine
11 1922-1947 Candlish Henderson
12 1947-1968 George Montgomery
13 1968-1972 Sir Thomas B Smith
14 1972-1977 Sir Gerald H Gordon
15 1977-1980 Eric Clive
16 1981-2006 Robert Black
17 2008- Kenneth Reid
Bayne, as already mentioned, was appointed by the Town Council, but the
founding statute, the Edinburgh Beer Duties Act of 1722, directed that, for
the future, “the Faculty of Advocates shall nominate and present Two Persons,
whom they shall judge qualified for supplying such Vacant Profession, to the said
Magistrates and Council; and that the said Magistrates and Council shall admit
One of the Two Persons so nominated and presented to supply the Vacancy”.
For the University itself no role was provided other than to accept the candidate
chosen by Faculty and Council.
In practice, the short leet of two was produced by open election by members of
the Faculty of Advocates. These were keenly contested31 and, until well into the
nineteenth century, politics and patronage played a part even if merit was usually
a prime consideration.32 To avoid the risk that the Council might override the
Faculty’s choice, the practice developed of nominating as the second candidate
a person whose position and status made it impossible that he would accept
appointment.33
Later, after the university reforms of 1858, the Council’s role was taken over
by the Curators of Patronage, whose membership was appointed partly by the
31 But occasionally, as with Bell and Moir, the willingness of a particular candidate to stand had the effect
of causing others to withdraw, leading to a unanimous election. See Reid (n 10) 7; Grant, University of
Edinburgh (n 2) vol II, 375-6.
32 Emerson, Academic Patronage (n 12) 264-6.
33 Anon, “The vacant professorship of Scots law” (1861) 5 J of Juris 558, 558-9.
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Council and partly by the University.34 At first quiescent, in due course they
sought a more active role. Following the appointment of Candlish Henderson
to the Chair in 1922, the Curators asked that in future the Faculty should supply
information as to the candidates’ qualifications;35 and in 1925 they requested that
the leet of two names should be presented without indicating any preference.36
Modest as they were, however, these requests do not seem to be have been acted
on, for when the Chair next fell vacant, in 1947, the Curators were reduced to
approaching the candidates directly for an “epitome” of their careers, while the
leet, as usual, indicated a preference. When the Curators remonstrated in respect
of the latter, the Faculty response was uncompromising, the Dean of Faculty37
expressing himself unaware “of any reasons for alteration of the longstanding
practice of expressing a preference, and that on information at present available
he does not feel that he could advise the Faculty to discontinue the practice”.38
Meanwhile, in a display of independence, the Curators had decided to interview
the candidates for themselves, although in the event their unanimous decision
was to appoint the candidate favoured by the Faculty.39 Future disagreement was
pre-empted by the repeal in 1947 of the 1722 Act,40 thus bringing the formal
involvement of the Faculty of Advocates to an end.41
34 Universities (Scotland) Act 1858 s 13. The Council had a 4:3 majority. The legislation followed decades
of disagreement between the Council and the Senatus of Edinburgh University, as to which see, e.g.,
Grant, University of Edinburgh (n 2) vol II, 1 ff. The Bill was piloted through the House of Commons
by John Inglis, the Lord Advocate: see J Crabb Watt, John Inglis, Lord Justice General of Scotland: A
Memoir (1893) 172-83. For background to the reform, see R D Anderson, Education and Opportunity
in Victorian Scotland (repr with corrections, 1989) ch 2.
35 Sederunt Book of the Curators of Patronage 7 July 1922, Edinburgh University Library, GB 237 EUA
IN1/GEN/PAT/3.
36 Minutes of Meetings of the Curators of Patronage 14 July 1925, Edinburgh University Library, GB 237
EUA IN1/GOV/PAT/5/2.
37 J S C Reid, QC, shortly thereafter to be appointed straight from the Bar as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.
38 For all information on the deliberations in 1947, see Edinburgh University Library, GB 237 EUA
IN1/GOV/PAT/5/2.
39 George Montgomery QC. The other candidate was William Garrett QC. The papers record some
disagreement as to how much weight should be given to the Faculty’s ranking.
40 Statute Law Revision Act 1948 s 1, sch 1.
41 Nevertheless, at least for a time the practice of providing a leet of two names continued. Perhaps no
one had noticed the repeal? So for example when the Chair of Civil Law became vacant in 1958, the
Faculty put forward the names of T B Smith, the Professor of Scots Law at Aberdeen University, and
T L Hird, a Senior Legal Assistant with Dundee Corporation who lectured in Civil Law at St Andrews
University. Smith, the Faculty’s choice, was appointed. See Minutes of Meetings of the Curators of
Patronage 14 March 1958, Edinburgh University Library, GB 237 EUA IN1/GOV/PAT3. Even today
a representative of the Faculty of Advocates sits as a courtesy in what is in other respects an ordinary
appointments committee.
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Given that the Chair was effectively in the gift of the Faculty of Advocates,
it is no surprise that the candidates were invariably drawn from its ranks.42 For
the first 250 years every appointee was a practising member of the Faculty of
Advocates, and it was not until the Faculty’s role ended, in 1948, that there was
appointed, first two advocates who were not then in practice43 and finally, as
recently as 1977, a solicitor.44 While, however, advocates have lost their monopoly,
it remains the case that all holders of the Chair have been members of one
or other branches of the legal profession. Such professional dominance had an
important influence on the nature of the Chair, and of the two other Edinburgh
chairs45 which were subject to appointment by the Faculty of Advocates. As
lecturing duties could be disposed of before or after the court hour, and other
duties were few, many of those appointed continued to practise at the bar or, like
Hume and Bell, took on other positions in the profession.46 The result was a close
link between University and Parliament House, often to the benefit of both; and
the teaching and writing of the Professors were informed by the experience, and
the needs, of practice.47 It is only in the last half-century that the requirements of
academic and professional life have each become so exacting that it is necessary
to choose between them. No Professor of Scots Law since Candlish Henderson
has maintained much in the way of a legal practice.48
Contemporary sources provide entertaining, not so say malicious, glimpses of
the early professors.49 Erskine, it was said, suffered from “extreme feebleness
of his voice” and, perhaps for that reason, displayed “excessive diffidence and
dislike to disputation”.50 Hume’s style was “heavy and affected, his delineation of
42 There were two solicitor candidates in 1947, but they received only one vote between them: see
F Craddock (ed), The Journal of Sir Randall Philip OBE, QC (1998) 41. Philip noted that the Chair
has been “thrown open to people who would continue to practise”.
43 T B Smith and Gerald Gordon. At the time of appointment both already held chairs at Edinburgh
University.
44 Eric Clive. I am only the second solicitor to hold the Chair.
45 Civil Law and Constitutional Law.
46 Both Hume and Bell accepted appointments as principal clerks of session.
47 R Black, “Practice and precept in Scots law” 1982 JR 31, 35-6.
48 From the point of view of the University, full-time devotion to the Chair had come to be seen as
desirable or even essential. At the time of George Montgomery’s appointment in 1947, the Secretary
to the University sought the assurance of the Secretary to the Curators of Patronage that Montgomery
would abandon legal practice. The assurance was duly given. See letter dated 13 June 1947 from the
Secretary to the Curators to the Secretary to the University, Edinburgh University Library, GB 237
EUA IN1/GOV/PAT/5/2.
49 One is reminded of Alan Rodger’s account of law professors who were ill or disabled (Lorimer’s weak
voice and eye-sight, Gloag’s withered arm, and so on), and the possible implications to be drawn from
that: see A Rodger, “Savigny in the Strand” (1990-92) 25-27 Irish Jurist 1 at 3-5.
50 J Ramsay, Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century vol I (ed A Allardyce, 1888; repr with
introduction by D J Brown, 1996) 146. On Erskine, see K G C Reid, “Introduction” to Erskine’s An
Institute of the Law of Scotland (Old Studies in Scots Law vol 5, 2014).
324 the edinburgh law review Vol 18 2014
principle superficial, his views on all matters of expediency or reason narrow,
indeed monastic”.51 Bell’s lectures “were generally considered profitless, and
his class were most inattentive”.52 His successor, More, was scarcely better at
keeping his students’ attention, his class being “disorderly and out of hand”,53
no doubt partly because he was a “plodding lawyer” who “knew so many cases,
and had studied so many decisions, that he could not tell what the law really
was”.54 Ross “was known as a stiff counsel and a bad pleader”.55 Rankine’s
lectures “varied little from year to year, even the jokes”.56 As for Montgomery,
“[i]f there were moments of levity they were very few – and always unintended
by our lecturer”. His lectures were simply readings from Gloag and Henderson,
“unadorned by anything that might stretch the imagination”.57 Of course, these
(selective) quotations are far from being balanced assessments of the person
under scrutiny, and it would be quite wrong to suggest that the Chair was
dominated by failed advocates, poor teachers, and social misfits. On the contrary,
although there were some weaker brethren,58 the holders of the Chair, taken
as a whole, have been quite extraordinarily distinguished, their contribution to
law and its literature incalculable.59 And in Erskine, Hume and Bell – the trio of
51 Lord Cockburn,Memorials of His Time (1856) 163. For Cockburn, of course, Hume was a political and
ideological opponent. On Hume, see G C H Paton, “A biography of Baron Hume”, in Baron David
Hume, Lectures 1786-1822 vol VI (ed G C H Paton; Stair Society vol 19, 1958) 327.
52 From the diary of one Thomas Fraser, quoted in T St J N Bates, “Mr McConnachie’s Notes and
Mr Fraser’s Confessional” 1980 JR 166 at 176. Fraser attended Bell’s lectures during the session 1831-2.
On Bell, see G W Wilton, George Joseph Bell (1929); Reid (n 10).
53 C Stewart, Haud immemor: reminiscences of legal and social life in Edinburgh and London, 1850-1900
(1901) 48.
54 Crabb Watt, John Inglis (n 34) 45.
55 Ibid.
56 J A Lillie, Tradition & Environment in a time of change (1970) 39. The example given of a Rankine
joke – “we’ve all got the seeds of dissolution in us” – does not suggest a gifted comedian.
57 Lord Hope of Craighead, “The strange habits of the English”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany Six
(Stair Society vol 54, 2009) 309.
58 Of the professors of the mid-Victorian period it was said that even their “warmest friends” could not
place them in the same category as Erskine and Bell: see Anon (n 33) 560. Two of those professors
had exceptionally short tenures, Ross because he died of diphtheria at the age of 49, and his successor,
Moir, because of ill health which led to his resignation after only two years. Moir’s main interests, in any
event, seem to have been in literature rather than law. He translated Schiller and contributed a regular
flow of essays to the main periodicals. Between 1825 and 1840 he had held the Chair of Rhetoric and
Belles Lettres. For an assessment of his literary output, see E E Eigner and G J Worth (eds), Victorian
Criticism of the Novel (1985) 39-40. From an earlier period, Wallace “was a popular and clever man
but he left no works other than a few humorous verses of no distinction”: see Emerson, Academic
Patronage (n 12) 265.
59 Brief biographical sketches of all the professors until 1865 can be found in Grant, University of
Edinburgh (n 2) vol II, 371-6. A number, both before 1865 and since, have entries in the Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography. Some other biographical material was indicated in previous
footnotes. Two of the post-war professors have been honoured with Festschriften: see D L Carey
Miller and D W Meyers (eds), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor
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institutional writers – there are three of the finest jurists in the history of Scots
law. Few law chairs in Scotland or England can muster so impressive a list of
incumbents.
(4) And their inaugural lectures
Until modern times an inaugural lecture was simply the first lecture of the
professor’s first course of lectures, in practice sometimes repeated as the first
lecture for subsequent years. The very first such lecture for the Chair of Scots
Law, that by Alexander Bayne, was probably given in Latin – a manuscript copy
in that language is held in Edinburgh University Library60 – but when Bayne
came to publish the lecture he did so in English.61 From Bayne there is a half-
century gap in the sources until the reasonably reliable texts that have survived
for the inaugural lectures of three consecutive Professors, Hume,62 Bell63 and
More,64 covering the period from 1786 to 1843. Thereafter there is nothing for
a further century by which time inaugural lectures had assumed their modern
form. Only two of the post-war professors gave inaugural lectures –Montgomery
and Black – and both lectures were subsequently published.65
There is much interesting material in all of these lectures, and it would be
possible to give an inaugural lecture simply on the topic of the inaugural lectures
of one’s predecessors. I will forbear from doing so, but I hope I can be forgiven for
saying something at least about these earlier lectures. The two modern lectures
are quite unlike the earlier ones or indeed each other: Montgomery’s – despite
Sir Thomas Smith QC (1992); J Chalmers, F Leverick and L Farmer (eds), Essays in Criminal Law
in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 8, 2010). In addition, the volume of
Juridical Review for 1982 was dedicated to papers in Smith’s honour, and Smith’s overall contribution
was reassessed in E Reid and D L Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith
and the Progress of Scots Law (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 1, 2005); see also, for a generally hostile
view, D J Osler, “The fantasy men” (2007) 10 Rechtsgeschichte 169 at 169-178.
60 The shelf mark is Dc.3.57. The title page says: “Mr Bain of Logie prof of Scots Law His Inogurall
Oration in the university”, and the next page is headed: “oratio Inauguralis Alex: Bain Legis Municipalis
Scotiae pp Habila in Academia Edinburgh: 1724”.
61 Bayne, Discourse (n 8). Cairns (n 23) 96 n 45 observes that the Latin and English texts are “close, but
by no means identical”.
62 Hume, Lectures vol 1 (n 1) 1-17.
63 K G C Reid, “George Joseph Bell’s inaugural lecture” (2014) 18 EdinLR 341.
64 J S More, Lectures on the Law of Scotland (ed J McLaren, 1864) vol I, 1-16.
65 G Montgomery, “Ninety years of progress” (1948) 60 JR 173; Black (n 47). Smith’s inaugural lecture
for the Chair of Civil Law at Edinburgh, given in 1958, can practically be regarded as an inaugural
lecture for the Scots Law Chair which he eventually assumed in 1968. See T B Smith, “Strange gods:
the crisis of Scots law as a civilian system”, in T B Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (1962) 72
(= 1959 JR 119). For an assessment of Smith’s remarkable lecture, some of the themes of which were
taken up by Robert Black in his own inaugural lecture for the Scots Law Chair, see K G C Reid, “While
one hundred remain: T B Smith and the progress of Scots law”, in Reid & Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed
Legal System in Transition (n 59) 1 at 11-21.
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a title, “Ninety years of progress”, which suggests a more reflective topic – is
an account of the legislation which removed legal disabilities from married
women, while Black’s – entitled “Practice and precept in Scots law” – attempts to
shame the legal profession into making greater use of Civilian and institutional
sources.66 With the earlier lectures, however, there is a great deal of common
ground, as indeed one might expect from texts which are primarily addressed to
a student audience embarking for the first time on a study of Scots law. Standard
ingredients include a history of the law in Scotland, admonitions to the students,
a review of sources and literature, and praise for the study of law in general and
of Scots law – that “system, which, perhaps, more than any other in ancient or
modern times, will be found to promote the prosperity, happiness, and freedom
of the people”67 – in particular.
Many of the admonitions are timeless and would command support today.
The study of law is “arduous” and “by no means seductive”.68 It is apt to induce
in the student “damp spirits”.69 Further, as the law is “one system”,70 mastery
of a part requires mastery of the whole, for the resolution of problems often
involves “a complex view of many principles at once”.71 And mastery in turn
requires that the law be committed to memory.72 Taking a rather narrow view
of his remit, More undertakes to “abstain from all mere speculative discussion
or antiquarian research”,73 and Hume too warns against “the debauchery of
metaphysical speculation”,74 but for Bell a lawyer must do more than collect
precedents and store his note book with practical information for “I can conceive
the case of the note book full while the head is empty”.75 Bayne is profligate, if
66 A lament for the neglect of older sources is far from being a novel theme. In his own inaugural lecture
from 140 years’ earlier, More said: “But I cannot pass from this reference to treatises on our law without
expressing my regret that the writings of our older lawyers have been too much neglected by modern
students. To this neglect it is owing that some of our modern practitioners are not so well skilled in our
forensic system as their predecessors.” The writers the study of whose work he particularly advocated
were Craig, Balfour and Kames – a rather miscellaneous list. See More, Lectures (n 64) vol I, 14.
67 Reid (n 63) 350.
68 Reid (n 63) 348.
69 Hume, Lectures vol I (n 1) 2.
70 Reid (n 63) 351. Bell contrasts this with the position in England where “by a perfect division of labour,
each lawyer applies to one branch only of law a practice apt certainly to cramp the mind. With us it is
different.”
71 Bayne, Discourse (n 8) 173.
72 Ibid.
73 More, Lectures vol I (n 64) 6.
74 Hume, Lectures vol I (n 1) 6. Nothing changes. Black returned to the subject in the most recent of
the inaugural lectures, attacking the view “that it is unnecessary, and perhaps even undesirable, for
law students in their degree studies to learn any law – or at least much law –which might be useful in
practice”: see Black (n 45) 37.
75 Reid (n 63) 348.
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repetitive, with study tips: read the text-book before the lecture; take good notes;
copy the notes out again as an aid to memory; summarise the text-book, “for
one can never abridge, till he comprehends well”; consult the Acts of Parliament
but be sparing of other sources that might “contribute rather to perplex than to
instruct you”; and finally, if you fall “a little backward”, concentrate on the present
work and catch up on the rest later.76 To assist the student in this programme
of unremitting activity there stands the professor and his lectures, smoothing, as
Hume put it, “the more rugged parts of the passage”.77 Yet even the best professor
can be no more than a “useful assistant and helper”:78 “it would not be right, even
if it were practicable, to relieve the student from the wholesome office of seeking
for knowledge by the efforts of his own attention; nor is it the tutor’s business to
save him the trouble of private research and of thinking for himself”.79
Such self-study, of course, presupposes a literature which is available to be
consulted; and if the first duty of the Professor of Scots Law is to teach, the
second is to contribute to that literature: for in writing as much as in teaching,
there are many “rugged parts of the passage” to be smoothed.
B. THE LITERATURE
(1) The four discouragements
The health of a legal system is tied to the state of its literature; and unless that
literature is reasonably up-to-date and comprehensive, the system will struggle to
attend to the affairs of its citizens or even, perhaps, to survive at all. Survival
is particularly likely to be at issue if the system is small and there are other
alternatives such as fusion. It is no surprise, therefore, that in Scotland the issue of
a healthy literature has tended to become entangled with a fear, in some quarters
at least, of Anglicisation and emasculation; for if there is no Scottish text on a
topic, a practitioner will inevitably reach for one written in England.
Although a proper study of legal literature in Scotland is lacking, the
broad outlines are reasonably clear.80 Following the writing of the general,
“institutional” texts in the long eighteenth century, a growing specialist literature
started to appear in the nineteenth. What began as a trickle in the first quarter of
the century –with the publication of treatises on conveyancing, leases, execution
76 Bayne, Discourse (n 8) 169-83.
77 Hume, Lectures vol I (n 1) 2.
78 Bayne, Discourse (n 8) 174.
79 Hume, Lectures vol I (n 1) 8.
80 The standard bibliographical source (although with numerous omissions) is L F Maxwell and
W H Maxwell, A Legal Bibliography of the British Commonwealth of Nations (1957) vol 5, 1-128.
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of deeds, succession, and so on – had, by the second half of the century, become
a veritable flood.81 After the First World War, however, the number of books fell
back considerably; and after the Second there was, for a time, a serious dearth
of literature followed by a remarkable revival, especially in the last 30 years.82
Whether that revival can be sustained is one of the questions that I will address
at the end of this paper.
“If our law faculties fail to provide adequate literature” on Scots law, T B Smith
warned in his inaugural lecture for the Chair of Civil Law at Edinburgh
in 1958, “they are accessories to its destruction”.83 Yet the academic who
would seek to answer this call is faced with a number of discouragements
which are different – though not, of course, necessarily more severe – than
those encountered in other areas of legal scholarship. I would mention four
in particular. There is a lack of publishing opportunities. There is a fear of
parochialism. There is concern about readership and use. And finally, there is
the question of whether the writing makes any difference, of whether – to use
the jargon of the REF84 – there is any “impact”. The four discouragements are
thus: no publishers, no foreign travel, no readers, and no impact. I will consider
each briefly in turn. Some, as we will see, are illusory or have been overtaken by
events; others, however, continue to present an obstacle to doctrinal legal writing
in Scotland.
(2) No publishers
Fifty years ago only one legal publisher was active in the Scottish market.85
Today there are five,86 and the environment is made more hospitable still by
the existence of book series whose purpose is or includes the promotion of
81 In his biography of Lord President Inglis (n 34), published in 1893, Crabb Watt writes (at 40) of the
1830s that: “The literature of the law was then a mere rivulet compared with the many wide and
branching streams into which it has since grown”. Aquatic metaphor seems irresistible in this area.
82 On the revival, and some of the reasons for it, see K G C Reid, “The third branch of the profession:
the rise of the academic lawyer in Scotland”, in H L MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into the 21st Century:
Essays in Honour of W A Wilson (1996) 39 at 43-6.
83 Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative (n 65) 87: “If our law faculties fail to provide adequate
literature in the Civilian tradition, they are accessories to its destruction”. As the full quotation shows,
Smith was primarily interested in literature which sought to shore up the Civilian component in
Scotland’s mixed legal system.
84 I.e. the Research Excellence Framework.
85 W Green. In addition the occasional law book was published by T & T Clark and by William Hodge.
86 W Green remains a dominant presence, but it has been joined by other publishers specialising in the
Scottish market, Avizandum and the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, while Scottish law books are
also issued by publishers with wider interests, the most important being Bloomsbury and Edinburgh
University Press.
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academic writing on Scots law: Edinburgh Studies in Law,87 Studies in Scots
Law,88 and above all the monograph series of the Scottish Universities Law
Institute (SULI),89 which has published many fine volumes and which recently
celebrated its fiftieth birthday.90 Finding buyers for these books, however, can
be a different matter. In the 1960s T B Smith complained of the “post-prandial
exhortations . . . from well-remunerated and well-refreshed legal celebrities who
urge others to write books, but would seldom lay down the price of their dinner
to purchase a treatise on law”.91 Since that time a sharp rise in the number of
law students coupled with a corresponding expansion of the legal profession has
created a market of a respectable size,92 although for some types of academic
book the sales figures remain dispiritingly small.
If books are (relatively) easy, articles – the staple diet of the academic,
especially in these days of the REF– are much harder. A Scottish private lawyer
who wants to publish in, say, the Law Quarterly Review or Modern Law
Review must either avoid Scots law altogether or smuggle the topic in – say in
footnote 420 – in a manner which goes undetected by the editor and reviewers.93
For purely Scottish writing the available outlets are meagre.94 At one time a
sympathetic home for serious writing, the Journal of the Law Society of Scotland
is today a glossy magazine for practitioners. Scots Law Times is not peer-reviewed
and so tends to be avoided by REF-conscious contributors. That leaves only
the Juridical Review, founded in 1889 and one of the oldest surviving law
periodicals in the English language, and that brash but welcome newcomer, the
Edinburgh Law Review, which first appeared in the mid-1990s. The Scottish
Law and Practice Quarterly, aimed bravely at academic writing of interest to
the practitioner, was unable to survive the decade from its foundation in 1995.
87 Published by Edinburgh University Press and edited from the Edinburgh Law School.
88 Published by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust and edited from the Edinburgh Law School. This
series is aimed primarily at the publication of doctoral theses.
89 For SULI, see Reid (n 65) 26-7.
90 To this list one might also add the Stair Society, founded in 1934, which publishes an annual volume on
Scottish legal history.
91 T B Smith, “Legal imperialism and legal parochialism” 1965 JR 39 at 53.
92 Reid (n 82) 40-3.
93 Of course there are exceptions. See e.g. A Rodger, “Scottish advocates in the nineteenth century: the
German connection” (1994) 110 LQR 563; R Evans-Jones, “Receptions of law, mixed legal systems and
the myth of the genius of Scots law” (1998) 114 LQR 228.
94 For a history of law periodicals in Scotland, see J C Brown, “Scottish legal periodicals, 1829-1935”, in
H McKechnie (ed), An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Stair Society
vol 1, 1936) 317; R Zimmermann, “Law journals in nineteenth-century Scotland” (2008) 12 EdinLR 9.
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(3) No foreign travel
When I was appointed to my first Chair, in 1994, I had almost never been abroad
for an academic purpose.95 Yet by then I had been an academic for fourteen
years and was not, I think, especially shy or retiring: in those days the most
excitement that could be mustered was a seminar in Dundee or a lecture in
Aberdeen. Admittedly, there was a certain amount of contact with the academic
world beyond Scotland; and, from an earlier generation, T B Smith in particular
was an inveterate traveller and a familiar presence at international gatherings.
Nonetheless, in the 1980s and early 1990s, and probably for long before, Scots
private law was inward-looking and isolated.96
The change since then has been both sudden and astonishing. Today private
lawyers from Scotland are found all over the world, while Scotland is a regular
host for conferences and for visits by individual scholars. The reasons for the
change are complex and not entirely clear.97 One is a European-wide, perhaps
even a worldwide, phenomenon: the wresting of comparative law from a narrow
band of comparative lawyers and its appropriation by those who wish to study
other systems so as to have a better understanding of their own.98 In an important
sense, all good lawyers are now comparative lawyers.
Another reason is the growing interest in the study of mixed legal systems – of
those systems, like Scotland, South Africa, Quebec and Louisiana, which
draw their law from both of the great European traditions, the Civil Law
and the Common Law.99 This takes forward an idea first developed by T B
Smith in the 1950s and 1960s but which was largely lost sight of until the
emergence of South Africa from Apartheid in the mid-1990s.100 For Scotland the
opportunity to explore the laws of its sister legal systems – of its sisters-in-law – has
been invigorating and enriching. There have been major collaborative projects
95 My very first foreign trip, to Moscow (with my colleagues Hector MacQueen and George Gretton), was
in December 1991. Disconcertingly, it coincided with the collapse of the USSR. A second visit followed
in March 1993. There were no other overseas excursions before 1995.
96 Writing in 1947, Lord Cooper said that: “For several generations we have been yielding in Scotland
to the lawyers’ besetting sin of insularity or isolationism”: see Lord Cooper of Culross, Selected Papers
1922-1954 (1957) 144.
97 Apart from those mentioned in the text, there are obvious reasons of a practical nature such as e-mail,
cheap air travel, and the emergence of English as the accepted lingua franca of academic exchange.
98 This idea is already present in Bayne’s inaugural lecture. See Bayne, Discourse (n 8) 151: “the
knowledge of the laws of other countries is chiefly useful, as it may conduce to give us a more perfect
knowledge of our own”.
99 See most recently V V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family, 2nd edn
(2012).
100 See K G C Reid, “The idea of mixed legal systems” (2003-04) 78 Tulane LR 5.
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comparing the private law of Scotland and South Africa,101 and of Louisiana and
Scotland,102 and much other activity besides.103
Finally, there is the emergence104 of the idea of European private law,
complete with a hectic programme of conferences, projects, publications,
and “soft law” or optional codes including the Draft Common Frame of
Reference105 – in substance a draft civil code for Europe – and, most recently, the
Common European Sales Law.106 In all of these activities the private lawyers of
Scottish universities have played a role whose prominence is out of all proportion
to the size of the jurisdiction. For the old adage that Scotland is a bridge
system between the Common and Civil Law traditions, often expressed but never
entirely believed in, at least by the Scots themselves, turns out to contain an
essential truth:107 in matters of European private law, Scottish lawyers, being as it
were “bilingual”, are uniquely well placed to contribute to the debate.108
There is more to all of this than foreign travel, good meals and gratification
of the ego, agreeable as these undoubtedly are. The comparative law enterprise
has changed the nature of private law scholarship in Scotland. More than half
a century after Lord Cooper advocated the study of comparative law “[i]f Scots
law is not merely to survive but to thrive”,109 much private law writing is now
informed and enriched by an understanding of how the same problems are
addressed in other jurisdictions.110 And in this there is a revival of a much
101 R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid, Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property
and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004).
102 V Palmer and E Reid (eds), Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland
(Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 6, 2009).
103 See most recently E Reid and D Visser (eds), Private Law and Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home
in Scotland and South Africa (2013).
104 One should more properly say “re-emergence” because behind this new ius commune lies a long
historical tradition. See e.g. J Blackie and N Whitty, “Scots law and the new ius commune”, in
MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into the 21st Century (n 82) 65.
105 C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft
Common Frame of Reference (2009). Quite apart from the text of the DCFR, the assembling of this
huge, six-volume commentary, running to nearly 7,000 pages, is an astonishing achievement. The key
role here of Eric Clive will be noted.
106 Proposal for a Regulation for a European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales
Law Com(2011) 635 final.
107 The origins of this idea seem to lie in comments by the French comparatist, Henri Lévy-Ullmann, in
his article on “The law of Scotland” (1925) 37 JR 370 at 390-1. See also e.g. T B Smith, British Justice:
The Scottish Contribution (1961) 3-5, 214.
108 See e.g. H L MacQueen, “Scots law and European private law”, in L Farmer and S Veitch (eds), The
State of Scots Law (2001) 59.
109 “The importance of comparative law in Scotland”, in Cooper, Selected Papers (n 96) 142 at 145.
110 An outstanding example of how fruitful such an approach can be is Ross Gilbert Anderson’s pioneering
study of Assignation (2008).
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older idea111 which emphasises the unity of the European legal tradition and the
importance of that tradition for Scotland.
(4) No readers
Academics today write more and, I fear, read less than once they did; and,
unavoidably, the more that is written, the less, relatively speaking, will be read.
But if all scholars write with the expectation, or at least the hope, of being read
within the academic community, those working in private law write not just for
each other but for a wider legal community. To some extent this is a matter of
duty; but it is also, for many, a matter of pride. Agreeable as it is to be discussed
in the academic literature, it is no less agreeable to imagine one’s text as the
indispensable source to which all practitioners unfailingly turn. And it may seem
more agreeable still to have it read, and cited, by the courts.
For about a century, however, ending as recently as the 1990s, the judiciary
in Scotland set its face again citing – or even considering – the works of living
academics.112 There were occasional exceptions, of course, but by and large it was
only the writings of those who were safely dead – often long safely dead –which
might be referred to. This “not read till dead” rule was memorably described by
Bill Wilson as being “of the same order of rationality as trial by ordeal”;113 and as
well as being discouraging for writers, at least if hoping for a long life, the rule was
almost absurdly inconvenient, for it hardly promoted the orderly development
of the law that the only books which could be referred to were already 50 or
100 years’ old. The standard justification for the rule – that a living author might
yet change his or her mind –was at all convincing only if the same rule were
applied to living judges, which of course it was not. The true reasons, however,
were harder to uncover. One was what was perceived, not always without reason,
as the low quality of the literature and of those who produced it. “The gradations
in intellectual ability are infinite”, wrote a serving sheriff in 1950, “and no one
in their sober senses would say that a professor of law has the ability of a
Master of the Rolls, or a Lord Chief Justice” – or, presumably, of a sheriff.114
111 But evident as recently as the inaugural lecture of Bell in 1822: Reid (n 63) 350: “the similarity among
the laws of all modern Europe may be traced to the civil or Roman institutions: in Scotland the
adoption of that system has been even more explicit than elsewhere”.
112 Reid (n 82) 46-9; Lord Hope of Craighead, “Helping each other to make law” (1997) 2 SLPQ 93.
The rule was the same in England: for the most recent discussion of the rule there, and its later
abandonment, see J Beatson, “Legal academics: forgotten players or interlopers?”, in A Burrows,
D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry (2013) 523.
113 W A Wilson, “Knowing the law and other things” 1982 JR 259 at 267.
114 1950 SLT (News) 1 at 2. The sheriff in question was C de B Murray.
Vol 18 2014 scots law and its edinburgh chair 333
Another was a supposed lack of practical experience which was thought to
hamper, if not disqualify altogether, academics from offering a view on the living
law. Early on in my career, an article which I had written with George Gretton
was dismissed by a Lord Ordinary as being the work of “two individuals whom I
understand to be academic lawyers”.115 It may be assumed that “academic” was
not intended as a word of praise.116 As it happened we were in good company, for
Alan Rodger had suffered the same sort of treatment a decade earlier at a time
when he had yet to embark on a career in practice.117 At bottom, however, the
spurning of living authors may have been to do with status and with competing
claims to intellectual leadership. “A text book writer”, Rankine explained to his
students at the start of the twentieth century, “is much inferior to a judge”.118 His
role is to report and to admire: it is for the judge to develop the law. For too long
it was conceived to be in the interests of the judiciary to keep matters that way.119
Today, when living authors are routinely cited to and by the court, these
arguments seem to belong to a remote past. But if “not read till dead” is an idea
which has run its course, it has been replaced by the anxiety of “not read at all”.
The anxiety is not of course new; but now that we know something of what courts
read – because they often cite it – we also have a much better idea of what they do
not read.120 A systematic study of non-citation has yet to be made. In its absence
it still seems possible to reach some tentative and impressionistic conclusions. I
offer two. In the first place, while books which amount to significant studies of
115 Deutz Engines Ltd v Terex Ltd 1984 SLT 273 at 275 per Lord Ross.
116 Today this approach would be unthinkable. See e.g. the reference to “Martin Hogg, a much respected
senior lecturer in law at the University of Edinburgh” in Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne
Group Ltd [2012] UKSC 56, 2012 SC (UKSC) 240 at para 21 per Lord Hope of Craighead. Professor
Hogg’s views, equally, did not command judicial support but they were treated with care and respect.
117 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Townsley 1971 SLT (Sh Ct) 37 at 39 per Sheriff Substitute Ian Dickson.
Looking back near the end of his life at this “sneering abuse by a bad-tempered sheriff-substitute”,
Rodger admitted that the abuse had given him “a mauvais quart d’heure, but not more than that,
since the criticism was plainly wrong and it only came from a sheriff-substitute”: see Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry, “Judges and academics in the United Kingdom” (2010) 29 University of Queensland LJ
29 at 33. There is probably a long tradition of thoughts of this kind even if the mode of expression
is more restrained. Bell, for example, who never abandoned practice, criticised Erskine, who did, on
the basis that a particular view had not been exposed to the “shock of principles” which legal practice
would have engendered. Stair, by contrast, was singled out for praise. See G J Bell, Commentaries on
the Law of Scotland and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence, 7th edn (ed J McLaren, 1870)
vol I, 260 n 2.
118 Notes on Rankine’s Lectures (c 1905, by an unnamed student; Edinburgh University Library GEN
1992/5) lecture 4.
119 Rodger (n 49) 11: “Perhaps in a smaller jurisdiction the judges have felt that open debate would
somehow lower the standing of the Court”.
120 Necessarily, these observation are confined to courts. What solicitors may read in the comfort of their
own offices is difficult to determine. A starting-point for research would be an examination of the state
of their libraries (as to which see also n 123 below).
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their subject are certainly used, there tends to be a time lag, sometimes of several
years, between publication and citation. Often indeed it takes several citations
before a book becomes widely known, prompting the unworthy suspicion that
counsel discover about books, not from libraries or bookshops or reviews, but
from the happenstance of citation in a previous case.
Secondly, and from an academic perspective much more importantly,
periodical literature is rarely cited even in the Inner House,121 a trend which
is likely to be reinforced by a new rule limiting authorities in reclaiming motions
to a joint bundle of ten for all parties.122 The position is sometimes different
in the Supreme Court, but few private law cases finish up there. As for the
Court of Session, if bar and bench fall eagerly on the Juridical Review and
Edinburgh Law Review as each new issue is published, there is little to show
for it in the law reports. Of course, some of the material which appears in
academic journals has no possible practical application; but that can hardly be
a complete explanation for this almost total neglect. The unwelcome truth is
that, while there are many individual exceptions, practitioners as a whole are little
interested in law as an academic discipline. Having taken their law degrees, they
put away their books. Of course such neglect is not confined to law graduates.
Alan Rodger has commented acutely on “the apparent failure of universities
to win over most of their graduates to any lifelong interest in the academic
aspects of the subjects which they study”, referring to “Sir Gawain and the Green
Knight peeping forlornly out from the growing thicket of Edna O’Briens and
Muriel Sparks on the shelves of someone who long ago did a course on English
Language”.123 But while the English Language community can withstand the
loss of readers for Sir Gawain, for the legal community in Scotland the lack of
academic engagement leads to an impoverishment of legal culture. To the extent
that the fault is that of the universities, we must work harder to remedy it. But at
the same time, if we seek to influence the practising community, wemust consider
more carefully where and how we publish.
121 Searches on the Westlaw database bear this out.
122 Court of Session Practice Note No 3 of 2011 para 91(b). A journal article or book is an “authority”
for this purpose. There can be exceptions but an interlocutor is required. I am grateful to Dr Ross
Anderson for drawing this rule to my attention.
123 Rodger (n 49) 5-6. He adds: “In the same way the office of many a lawyer contains a small cluster
of ageing or obsolete textbooks which would allow a legal archaeologist to determine fairly precisely
when the occupant graduated and thereby released himself from the painful obligation to purchase
legal texts”.
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(5) No impact
As will be obvious from what has been said already, private lawyers were
concerned with impact on the wider community long before this became an
objective of funding bodies or rewarded by points in the REF. Yet the manner in
which impact might work or be calibrated has been little studied. The following
are no more than some preliminary thoughts.
When academic writing is used by legal practitioners this is done, naturally
enough, in a highly selective and limited way. And while the morsels of
scholarship thus sampled may lead to incremental development of the law, at
least if they are taken on by the courts, any impact is likely to be correspondingly
small. That is fine as far as it goes, of course, but impact by morsel does little
to stir the blood. The question is whether impact can be achieved on a larger
scale. Can new conceptualisations and theoretical insights gain acceptance in the
legal community and become, in a formal sense, a part of the law? Or must ideas
remain stranded in the groves of academe so that, over time, there is an increasing
disjunction between law as conceived in the universities and law as practised in
the community?
Let me test these questions with an example with which I had some personal
involvement. It is taken from the law of trusts. In a trust, a trustee owns property
on behalf of a beneficiary; yet if the trustee becomes insolvent, the beneficiary is
protected and the trust assets cannot be attached by the trustee’s private creditors.
This is a familiar and long-standing rule; indeed without it trusts would hardly
be workable, for few people would entrust money to a person who might then
proceed to lose everything in an insolvency. But while the rule is clear the reasons
for it are not. In Common Law jurisdictions this “insolvency effect” is explained
by recourse to equity. In Scotland, Civilian as to its property law, that explanation
is not available. Yet the traditional tools of Civil Law property, with their real
right/personal right dichotomy, are hardly adequate for the task. A beneficiary’s
right cannot be real because it does not attach to a particular thing but rather to
a pool of assets which can move into or out of the trust as the trustee chooses.
But if the right is only personal it could not prevail in the bankruptcy of the
trustee but would rank with the personal rights of other creditors. How, then, is
the insolvency effect to be explained? At best, the attempts to do this have been
unconvincing;124 at worst they have verged on the comical. Rankine’s account to
124 As in W A Wilson and A G M Duncan, Trusts, Trustees and Executors, 2nd edn (1995) 15-18.
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his students – to take just one example – is deeply confused125 and seems to allow
the beneficiary a right which oscillates between the personal and the real:126
The beneficiary has a personal right in the trust estate which we call Equitable Estate
or a jus crediti. This includes a real burden in the Fee. He has a real right to call on the
Trustee to convey or transfer or denude himself of the subject; it is a real or personal
right of property according to circumstances.
In his contribution to the Wilson memorial volume, back in 1996, George
Gretton suggested that the answer might lie in the concept of patrimony.127 In
this he was drawing on an idea which was developed in the 1930s by a French
jurist, Pierre Lepaulle, to explain, not perhaps very plausibly, the Common Law
trust.128 Subsequently both George Gretton and I carried out work on this idea
and explored its implications.129 The result has been the development of a new
theory of trusts.130 The ramifications are complex, but the essence of the theory
can be expressed quite simply. A “patrimony” – or “estate” to use a term much
more familiar to lawyers in the UK– is the sum total of a person’s assets and
liabilities. Normally the rule is: one person one patrimony. A trustee, however,
has two patrimonies, his private patrimony and the trust patrimony, and these
patrimonies are quite separate not only as to assets – something everyone has
always understood – but as to liabilities as well. This idea answers the question
it set out to answer: the reason why a beneficiary prevails over private creditors of
the trustee is that each must claim from a different patrimony; the beneficiary’s
right is personal but it is a personal right in respect of the trust patrimony.
125 A confusion which is different but no better can be found in A Mackenzie Stuart, The Law of Trusts
(1932) 1.
126 Notes on Rankine’s Lectures (n 118) lecture 40. In fairness to Rankine, it is possible that the student in
question misunderstood what was said. But the notes seem generally accurate and clear, and it would
be hard for a student to imagine a theory of this kind.
127 G L Gretton, “Trust and patrimony”, in MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into the 21st Century (n 82) 182
at 188-90.
128 P Lepaulle, Traité théorique et pratique des trusts en droit interne, en droit fiscale international (1932).
For criticism of this theory as it applies to Common Law trusts, see L Smith, “Trust and patrimony”
(2009) 28 Estates, Trust and Pensions Journal 332.
129 K G C Reid, “National report for Scotland”, in D J Hayton et al (eds), Principles of European Trust
Law (1999) 67; G L Gretton, “Trusts without equity” (2000) 49 ICLQ 599; K G C Reid, “Patrimony
not equity: the trust in Scotland” (2000) 8 Eur Rev of Priv Law 427; K G C Reid, “Conceptualising
the Chinese trust: some thoughts from Europe”, in R van Rhee and L Chen (eds), Towards a Chinese
Civil Code: Historical and Comparative Perspective (2012) 209. Some of the most important papers
are collected in R Valsan (ed), Trusts and Patrimony (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 14, forthcoming).
130 R G Anderson, “Words and concepts: trust and patrimony”, in Burrows et al (eds), Judge and Jurist
(n 112) 347. Quite independently, and also based on the work of Lepaulle, patrimony was being used
as an explanation of trusts in Latin America: see N Malumian, Trusts in Latin America (2009) 19-23.
This topic cannot be explored further here.
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More than that, however, the idea allows for a wholly new theory of allocation
of liabilities.
This new theory, as it turned out, was well-timed. In international legal
scholarship, trusts in Civil Law systems are one of the topics of the moment.131
Many countries in the Civil Law tradition, notably in Latin America and the Far
East, have already introduced the trust;132 others, especially in Europe, seem
poised to follow suit if they have not done so already.133 But all must face up to
the problem which has long exercised jurists in Scotland: how is the insolvency
effect to be explained? Ex Scotia lux: against this promising background, the
separate patrimony theory has generated considerable interest and support. It
has been used in no fewer than three soft-law projects in Europe, including
the DCFR,134 and a flattering amount of admiration has been expressed for the
“Scottish trust”.135 The only trouble, of course, is that it may not be the Scottish
trust at all. The dual patrimony theory is how certain scholars have chosen to
conceptualise the trust. It is what we tell our students. It has been adopted by
the Scottish Law Commission.136 But, until very recently, it had made little or
no mark on the case law.137 And so just as the protagonist in The Importance of
Being Earnest was known as Ernest in London and, more soberly, as Jack in the
country, so the Scottish trust was based on dual patrimony abroad and on a less
than coherent account of beneficiaries’ rights in Scotland itself.
Views, of course, may differ as to the value of the dual patrimony theory. But
the question of how, if at all, new theories enter the life-blood of a legal system
is a more general one. This may not often occur through case law. The task of a
131 See most recently, L Smith (ed), Re-imagining the Trust: Trusts in Civil Law (2012).
132 See e.g. Malumian, Trusts in Latin America (n 130); L Ho and R Lee (eds), Trust Law in Asian Civil
Law Jurisdictions: a Comparative Analysis (2013).
133 See e.g. A Braun, “The framing of a European law of trusts”, in L Smith (ed), The Worlds of the Trust
(2013) 277.
134 von Bar and Clive (eds), Draft Common Frame of Reference (n 105) Book X. The others are Hayton
et al (eds), Principles of European Trust Law (n 129); S C J J Kortmann et al (eds), Towards an EU
Directive on Protected Funds (2009).
135 See e.g. Hayton et al (eds), Principles of European Trust Law (n 129) 4 (“the Scottish National Report
may prove to be of particular interest to civilians considering the implementation of the trust in their
domestic law”); H L E Verhagen, “Trusts in the civil law: making use of the experience of ‘mixed’
jurisdictions”, in J M Milo and J M Smits (eds), Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems (2001) 93 at 108 (“The
main source of inspiration for the third approach – the obligational approach [favoured by a group of
Dutch scholars] –was Scots law”); L Smith, “The re-imagined trust”, in Smith (ed), Re-imagining the
Trust (n 131) 258 at 265 (“The Scottish approach is winning converts”).
136 Discussion Paper on the Nature and Constitution of Trusts (Scot Law Com DP No 133, 2006) paras
2.16-2.28.
137 So for example in Joint Administrators of Rangers Football Club plc, Noters [2012] CSOH 55, 2012
SLT 599, Lord Hodge said (at para 31) that: “The right of a trust beneficiary in the estate of a trust,
although a personal right, prevails over the unsecured creditors of the trustee in the latter’s insolvency
.. As insolvency is the acid test of property rights, the beneficiary’s right is in that sense proprietary.”
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judge – and I say this not in any spirit of criticism – is to decide the case in front
of him or her and not to pursue academic theories of little relevance and, it may
be, of questionable value. It is true that a theory taught so long in universities
as to seem simple orthodoxy may find its way into judgments unobserved and
unremarked; this is impact, albeit after a long delay. It is also true that a case or
series of cases may raise a fundamental question of private law which, in the right
judicial hands, prompts a rather swifter change of direction. In recent times this
has been seen in the law of unjustified enrichment138 and in the rules of transfer
of ownership of heritable property;139 and as it happens, it is also now beginning
to be seen in relation to the dual patrimony theory of trusts, some two decades
after that theory was first developed.140 No doubt this sort of thing would occur
more often if judges and counsel were willing to be bolder, as I believe they need
to be in a small jurisdiction like Scotland where a case may present a once-in-a-
generation opportunity. Even so, it would be unrealistic to expect too much: most
change wrought by case law will inevitably be modest and incremental.141
The answer must lie not in case law but in legislation. If the eighteenth
century was the age of the jurist, and the nineteenth and twentieth the age of
the judge, the twenty-first will surely be the age of the legislator. Indeed the
pattern is already clear. The encroachment of legislation into areas of private
law which were once the preserve of the courts is no less important for having
been largely unremarked. For this the most important single reason is the work
of the Scottish Law Commission which, despite periodic lamentation to the
contrary, has been remarkably successful in guiding its proposals on to the statute
book. A further factor is the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.142
138 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151; Shilliday
v Smith 1998 SC 725; Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90. The
cases pay tribute to the academic literature and debate.
139 Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66; Burnett’s Tr v Grainger [2004] UKHL 8, 2004 SC (HL) 19.
The influence of academic writing is especially apparent from comments of Lord Hope of Craighead,
writing extra-judicially: see “Helping each other to make law” (n 112) 98-100; “Scots law seen from
south of the border” (2012) 16 EdinLR 58 at 69-72.
140 Glasgow City Council v The Board of Managers of Springboig St John’s School [2014] CSOH 76
at paras 16 and 17 per Lord Malcolm (“the notion of a trustee’s dual patrimony is helpful and can
assist in an understanding of many of the implications and consequences of our law of trusts”). For
earlier glimpses, see Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd v AMEC Construction Scotland Ltd [2007] CSOH
179, 2008 SC 201 at para 12(b) per Lord Emslie (summarising an argument of counsel); Ted Jacob
Engineering Group Inc v Matthew [2014] CSIH 18 at para 90 per Lord Drummond Young (referring
to “interesting academic articles” by Professors Gretton and Reid).
141 Rodger (n 117) 32.
142 For an assessment of the Parliament’s legislative record, see E E Sutherland et al (eds), Law Making
and the Scottish Parliament: the Early Years (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 9, 2011).
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The facts speak for themselves. Much of family law143 and significant areas of
property law144 are now enshrined in statute. A start has been made on contract
law with more almost certainly to come,145 and major legislation seems probable
in the fields of trusts and succession.146 From the private law heartland, only delict
and unjustified enrichment have been largely unaffected, at least in respect of
general principles,147 although the latter had what some would regard as a narrow
escape.148 Whether one welcomes these developments or abhors them– and I am
firmly in the first camp – it is impossible to deny the significance of what, in some
cases at least, is virtually codification by stealth.149 Law professors in pursuit of
impact should pay less attention to judges: the new rulers of the universe are the
members of the Scottish Law Commission.150
C. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
On examination, then, the four discouragements turn out to be not especially
discouraging, or at least far less discouraging than once they were. Indeed
conditions for private law scholarship in Scotland have probably never been
better. That, no doubt, is why the last 30 years have been so wonderfully
productive.
Can the position be maintained or even improved upon? In English
universities there has been a sharp move away from doctrinal scholarship,
143 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976; Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977; Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection)
(Scotland) Act 1981; Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984; Family Law (Scotland)
Act 1985; Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986; Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act
1991; Children (Scotland) Act 1995; Civil Evidence (Family Mediation) (Scotland) Act 1995; Civil
Partnership Act 2004; Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006; Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007;
Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014; Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014.
144 Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970; Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland)
Act 2000; Mortgage Rights (Scotland) Act 2001; Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003; Title Conditions
(Scotland) Act 2003; Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004; Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012; Long
Leases (Scotland) Act 2012.
145 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985;
Contract (Scotland) Act 1997; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, SI 1999/2083. The
Scottish Law Commission is currently engaged on a major project on contract law in the light of the
DCFR: see Annual Report 2012 (Scot Law Com No 230, 2013) 17-18.
146 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 215, 2009). A Report by the
Scottish Law Commission on Trusts is expected to be published towards the end of 2014.
147 There has been legislation in respect of some specific topics in the law of delict, such as product
liability (Consumer Protection Act 1987) and damages (Damages (Scotland) Act 2011).
148 Report on Unjustified Enrichment, Error of Law and Public Authority Receipts and Disbursements
(Scot Law Com No 169, 1999), especially part 5. After a prolonged review of the law, the Commission
came out against significant legislation in this area.
149 The promotion of codification, of course, is one of the statutory duties of the Scottish Law
Commission: see Law Commissions Act 1965 s 3(1).
150 A significant number of whom have been academic lawyers.
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following a trend which was already all too apparent in the United States; and
in some of the universities of Scotland too, there is an evident decline in the
number of scholars working in the field of private law. The reasons for this are
complex but include the internationalisation of law schools as well as a much
firmer distinction – now an almost impassable bridge – between the practising
and the academic professions. Above all there is the feeling, which would be
puzzling to lawyers in Continental Europe, that the energy has gone out of
doctrinal scholarship, that there is nothing new to be discovered, and that the
whole enterprise is, in some sense, hopelessly old-fashioned.151 In Scotland, at
least, nothing could be further from the truth. To achieve a proper understanding
of our law there is still so much to be done, so many areas to be investigated,
so many sources to be trawled. To research private law is to live on the edge of
perpetual discovery. That the work is exacting is a further cause of stimulus, for
the private lawyer must be a logician, a comparatist, a historian, a legal theorist,
a law reformer and, increasingly, a social scientist.152 Private law in Scotland
will thrive for as long as private lawyers are able to communicate to others the
excitement of the enterprise on which they are engaged. That, I conceive, is not
the least of the tasks of the Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh.
151 Rodger (n 117) 34.
152 Comparative law and legal history have in particular claimed the attention of Scottish private lawyers
in recent years. This can be seen in innumerable academic papers and books on private law as well as
in works in which comparative law or legal history is the explicit focus. In addition to the works cited
in nn 101-03 above, these include R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Stair
Society Supplementary Series vol 2, 1995); D L Carey Miller and R Zimmermann (eds), The Civilian
Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (1997); K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds),
A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000); H MacQueen and R Zimmermann (eds), European
Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 2, 2006); W M
Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh Studies in Law
vol 4, 2007).
